Abstract: This paper draws on the question of the actors' interests during the last phase of the Congolese transition. Theses interests should not be solely understood through the lens of the pursuit of power and control of moribund Congolese state. Instead, their diversity can be traced at all levels of the society, among all kinds of actors and also in the regional and international orders. One of the main issues of Congo's »pacifi cation« lies in the fact that these interests have mainly been addressed with little consideration for the idea of common good. Finding a solid ground where competing interests could express themselves in a »sub-optimal« manner is the challenge Congo and its partners are now facing.
Pacifi cation from outside?
C rab is not a particularly popular or common dish in Congo. With only 37 kilometers of sea coastline, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 1 (DRC) hardly gives its fi shermen the opportunity to fi ll their creels with many crabs. Fortunately, the brackish waters of the Congo river have endowed Congo with cossa cossa -a sort of local shrimp -which is much appreciated by Western expatriates in Kinshasa for its tasty fl esh.
The existence of cossa cossa allows a French popular saying to make sense in the context of the Congo. Politics in Congo is like a »crab basket«: those inside the basket silently wolf each other down, but putting a hand in the basket will lead to a truce just long enough for the hand to be torn apart by the crabs. Like crabs, cossa cossa bite hands and feed themselves with the bodies they fi nd in their ecosystem. On the larger scale of the Congo, it is unclear whether one should see the whole country has been thrown into a cossa cossa basket, or whether it is just a gigantic basket of cossa cossa, waiting for foolhardy hands to show up.
A great interest of the Congo lies in the interests of those competing for survival; from the relegated Kinshasa urban poor striving to gather enough food to see the light of another day, to the »big man« struggling to keep his »position of accumulation«. But why are these interests apparently so crucially rivaling? What do they boil down to, and why is the end of the Congolese transition and the election a good place to try to draw a consistent, static picture of these interests? What are the respective parts played by endogenous and exogenous interests?
Understanding what the crabs compete for requires a differentiated approach of what the idea of »interests« means. At the macro scale of international politics, »interest« is synonymous with the realist idea of national interests, grand politics, and the struggle of states for power. In an economic sense, interest is closer to the relative idea of »return« -a negotiable price one gets through an exchange or a loan. At a micro sociological scale, »interests« explain individual or group preferences, cultural features, and choices (rational or not). The Congolese electoral process was an opportunity to grasp these sets of interests which, for a short moment, became a little more still and steady than usual, after the continuous succession of crises that started in spring 1994 with the infl ux of Rwandan refugees into then Zaire.
One of the key features of this special moment at the end of the transition is that the stakes are extremely high for the actors. Stakes and interests are thus almost synonymous in this major political reshuffl e, which combines the old interests of those involved in the Congolese crisis, and the new challenges of the (hopeful) reconstruction to come. One of the main features of this reshuffl e is that it rests in an imperfect balance between internal and external processes, where inside and outside are in fact often entangled. Eufor RD Congo has been in quite a privileged position to understand them, and this allows me to draw the following few lessons.
Congo in its regional environment: ending the crisis of integration?
The statement that the Congolese war of 1998-2003 may constitute the »First African World War« is commonplace. It is, however, true in the sense that Congo's neighbors' interests, a majority of whom have intervened militarily in the country, have had a decisive infl uence in the rise and developments of the Congo grand crisis from 1996 to 2006.
Regional appeasement
The months that preceded the beginning of the electoral process saw a decrease in tension in the region, most notably with regional »godfathers« of past rebellions, namely Rwanda and Uganda. There has been a form of aggiornamento in Rwanda's policy toward Congo, which took the form of accepting Congo as indivisible. Kigali's major interests are now safe, as Kinshasa, with the help of the international community, seems committed to addressing the issue of the FDLR combatants, and has guaranteed that Rwanda's economic interests 2 in eastern Congo will be preserved. An institutional guarantee of this last point is even provided by the Congolese constitution of December 2005, which establishes quite a decentralized governance structure for the country and its economic management.
Overall, this partial yet encouraging tacit settlement has had three main consequences for the Congo, which were observable during the very end of the transition. First, there has been a shift in the »geographical physiognomy« of the Congolese crisis, with tensions in the eastern Congo no longer capable of shaking the country to the point of collapse 3 . Second, the relative soothing of the Kigali-Kinshasa relations has had very differentiated consequences in terms of internal, electoral politics. Kabila's popularity was soaring in the East, as he enjoyed his reputation as a »local«, and most importantly of a »peace maker«, among the populations who suffered the worst of the war. But for the same reasons, the incumbent president invited resentment and hatred in the West and in his capital city, where he was seen as foreigner 4 and a weak lackey of Rwanda. Third and consequently, this example illustrates the importance for the international community to secure »pacifi cation from outside« at the regional level in order for an operation like Eufor RD Congo to succeed. Indeed, the European force would not have had the strength to carry out the same mandate if Eastern Congo had not had an acceptable level of peace 5 . Brokering a consensus with Rwanda and the other regional powers therefore was an important part of the preliminary diplomatic efforts made by the European Union to have the principle of an operation accepted 6 . However, the prospect for potential destabilization from outside in Congo's regional environment is still alive, and it takes forms that have already been witnessed in the past, notably »confl ict creep«. In that respect, the situations in Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic are of concern for Congo. In any case, and despite the goodwill shown by other neighbors in the resolution of the situation (e.g. Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon), one should not forget that the »interests« Congo represents may be ones that imply survival for the régime. Angola has already demonstrated in the past that it would do anything to prevent the revival of a movement such as UNITA; Uganda has interests in Ituri it cannot simply give up for the sake of keeping stability in Kampala. The coming months will also see Congo as a »re-nascent« state, having to assume certain responsibilities it had been exempt from for a long time as a »failed state«. Beyond examples taken from sheer security issues, the case of trans-border migrations to Angola has already started to create tensions with this country. Even in a peaceful environment, neighbors' interests per se may not necessarily be played down.
Finally, one should not forget that the crab basket situation of Congo is also illustrated by the persistent instability and violence in the Eastern part of the country. Disarming campaigns have had mixed results in Ituri, numerous rebel groups are still active in the Kivus, and Laurent Nkunda's forces still constitute a reserve available for a destabilization campaign in case of a reversal of alliances and agreements that were reached at the national level.
Strategic rivalries and economic competition
At a much lower scale of intensity, the »Congolese« stake is still a fi eld for the expression of competing regional interests. Specifi cally, the game of positioning strategic and economic interests can very much be played at the sub-regional level.
It should be noted here that the Congo is a member of two rival organizations, CEEAC 7 and SADC 8 , which are as much sub-regional organizations as leverages and entry points for the respective interests of the two local hegemons -Angola and South Africa. Naturally these two actors' interests are not necessarily opposite, and Congo knows very well how to make a clever use of its powerful neighbors' rivalry 9 .
In fact, it could be argued that part of the Congo's problem stems from the numerous and cumbersome »friends« for whom the Congo has become a »political market« where they exert their respective strategies of infl uence, even for the sake of peace and stability. The example of Security Sector Reform 10 (SSR) illustrates how Congo is at the same time a stake for external powers, and makes use of the political space thus created to gain independence and remuneration. In this game, sub-regional organizations themselves are not the clumsiest actors: during the electoral process, the SADC and the CEEAC respectively attempted to launch military operations similar to Eufor, in order to succeed or complement it. The lack of means and time, as well as rivalries between states defeated 7 Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale. 8 Southern African Development Community. 9 Economic interests appear to be dominant in the case of South Africa (size of the Congolese market and mining potential), while Angolan concerns are more focused on security issues (securing access to the Cabinda enclave, controlling the infl ux of Congolese emigrants and making sure UNITA is dead for good). these initiatives, which were mostly ways to assert the respective roles of the South African and Angolan hegemons in Congo, while taking advantage of a hypothetical European funding contribution.
Settling an internal power and governing the Congo
In the multi-layered disorder of Congo, the issue of pacifi cation is one that borrows both from the inside and the outside, and largely stems from what has become a cliché to call the »failed« nature of the Congolese state. The situation is in fact very close to the one described by Kisangani 11 , where in Congo's history, each new attempted institutional setting is »polluted« by unsolved issues from previous attempts, and may greatly impact the relations of Congo with its neighbors 12 , not even to mention its internal stability. Thus, pacifying the Congo probably requires, above all, ruling the country. At long last.
Ending war, beginning democracy
One of the most original aspects of the diffi cult process of bringing Congo to peace and democracy lies in what has been described as »winner takes all« politics 13 . This concept partly echoes with the history of Congo, and the idea of domination by a deceptive and kleptocratic 14 state under Mobutu, which seriously hampers the building of a representative, impartial state apparatus, let alone an effi cient one. The »winner takes all« culture found a sad illustration in its collision with the international community's plans in the heart of Kinshasa on August 20 th -22 nd 2006.
While the fi nal results of the fi rst round of the presidential election were being announced, violent confrontations (involving heavy weapons and tanks) took place between the president's Republican Guard and vice-president Bemba's forces. For three days, the security situation remained very volatile and the combat claimed dozens of lives. On this occasion, Eufor successfully intervened at the request and with the cooperation of the MONUC, and interposed itself between the two parties.
This development brought the transition to the edge of collapse, and it illustrates two important points about the incumbent president. First, an electoral defeat was inconceivable in his eyes 15 ; second he needed to appear as a strong man in the Another form of political »holism« that compromised the stability of the Congolese transition was reawakened during the electoral process and campaign: ethnic dynamics. As such, ethnicity can be used in a partly stabilizing manner, as Mobutu used it to allow a »rotatory cooptation« of the elites, but also as a ferment of dissension -which Mobutu also did, notably by exploiting the »anti-Rwandan« and »anti-Tutsi« feelings in early 1990s Eastern Zaire 17 .
However, the 2006 electoral campaign at the national level showed that the local actors' interests were heading to a renewed language of essentialism and identity narratives focused on the origins of the candidates, instead of pure ethnicism. This »autochthonist« platform, which Jean-Pierre Bemba's supporters' made inordinate use of, is grounded in the idea that different cultural behaviors among some Congolese groups testify to their foreign origins (not consistent with the idea of »congolité«) and their dubious allegiance to the Congo -which therefore justifi es their discrimination.
Such a body of ideas is not a novelty, and has even been successful in Eastern Congo for many years, where it has become a structuring phenomenon of political identities, to varying degrees 18 , essentially against groups perceived as »Rwandan«. But the real novelty lies in the proclivity of these themes to mobilize Congolese constituency and polarize it along a linguistic line. In the West, where Lingala is spoken as a lingua franca, and where Swahili speakers are regarded distrustfully, the majority voted for Bemba (approximately 70% of the votes). This is opposed to the East, where Swahili is the lingua franca, and where Kabila's popularity is overwhelming (approximately 90% of the votes).
Without going into the sociological details underlying such a divide, it should be noted that it poses a major challenge to the new government in terms of its ability to govern the country, which will lack the legitimacy to rule a country so profoundly divided into two blocks 19 . In that respect, the Congolese crabs in the basket have (once again) favored the safeguarding of their ethnic and personal interests 20 in order to secure themselves a capacity of mobilization, and have abandoned the idea of acting in favor of the public good.
16 As a mirror to Kabila's reaction, a lot could be said about Bemba's »stagecraft« production of violence as a mean to catalyze popular support in Kinshasa during the electoral process. The best example of which was the incredibly brutal political rally Bemba led in Kinshasa on July 27th 2006, just three days before the fi rst round of the presidential elections. During the massive procession, several institutions associated with Kabila's power were sacked and burnt, several policemen were brutally murdered and literally dismembered, and their limbs were exhibited by the demonstrators as trophies.
Beyond an act of protest, this was also a very powerful provocation and humiliation of Kabila, who scored a weak 14% It remains all the more true that an uncertainty prevails in terms of a potential new »cycle« of internal instability. As mentioned, the results of the institutional reform that should lead Congo on the path of formal decentralization are still unclear 21 . And the temptation for the government to act in a much more centralized manner than originally expected may be as strong as that of local grievances to express themselves in a disturbing fashion, such as Bundu Dia Kongo in the Bas-Congo province 22 . Again, the instability and violence that still prevail in Eastern Congo cannot only be addressed by brutal repression. For this long-lasting violence has yielded a new sociological functioning that cannot be reverted in little time and with little means. The interests of local actors and militiamen in these regions are the mere translation at the level of the group and the individual of Congo's deep crisis of state and democracy integration -the elusive quest for the common good.
Survival
Nonetheless and unfortunately, a sociological defi nition of what common interest is in Congo may not be that diffi cult to fi nd in the ethos of »survival«, which encompasses virtually all political behaviors and strategies, from the top to the bottom of the Congolese society. At the top, the topos of survival is somehow close to the idea of »politics of the belly 23 «. This found a quasi-paroxysmic illustration during the Congolese transition, when the economic structure of the Congolese state modeled itself on the so peculiar and ineffi cient political structure of the time 24 . Thus, the economy found itself totally subordinate to politics without any consideration for the common good on the part of the actors' interests. They simply shared the »fl agships« of the national economy and lucrative appointments in a way that evoked the purest patrimonialist conception of politics and a »rent economy« -where the position provided to a group of actors matters more than actual production of wealth.
But the actors of the international community have the ability to antagonize this endless quest of what the people of Kinshasa calls »bouffer« (»gobble up«) 25 . Opening the taps of gains such as those from international aid and cooperation, could well take less indulgence from the part of donors. At least under the condition that they fi ne-tune their interests and offer a close front to the leaders of »new Congo«, who are dreaming of an even more exclusive sharing of the »national cake« (as the Nigerian saying goes).
Unfortunately, the democratic demands are also often sacrifi ced to the benefi t of this survival logic -sometimes under the very name of democracy: the alliance brokered before the second round of the presidential election between Antoine Gizenga's PALU and Joseph Kabila's AMP is less suggestive of genuine coalition, than of a process of capturing unanimity and dismantling the few democratic advances of the end of the transition.
But the topos of survival is not only a matter of the »top«. The harshness of life in Kinshasa has turned »débrouille« (»re-sourcefulness«) into a foundation of social life and behavior 26 . For the actors of the »bottom«, survival means to demonstrate by any means one's existence. There lies the interest of the survival ethos: securing an existence position in the future political setting of Congo. Three kinds of actors deserve here a closer look: the street, moral entrepreneurs, and the fi gure of the »spoiler«.
Indeed, the »street« per se has no »interests«. But it is in the streets that one may fi nd a great deal of political expression and mobilization. This proved particularly true in the past 15 years, through a succession of riots in Kinshasa 27 and other cities, which has given a considerable power to those who know how to control and manipulate discontent from a population who is swift to rise up. The political »death« of Etienne Tshisekedi's party UDPS 28 , that occurred during the electoral process in which Mobutu's historic opponent refused to take part, may well be a mere episode of no consequence in terms of potential for unrest from the part of the relegated population -the security issue in Kinshasa remains as burning as it was, mutatis mutandis in 19 th century Paris. Also, popular discontent is all the more useful that peacekeepers and international interveners are utterly destitute to face it and to react against it 29 .
Concerning the case of moral entrepreneurs such as churches, the struggle for survival boils down to an intense competition. There exists a temptation of radicalization and even individual confl icts within these institutions -in order to remain at the center of moral and identity strategies of the Congolese 30 . A similar point could be made about the Congolese press, and the way it found itself trapped between the authoritarian 26 G. De Villers, J. Omasombo Tshonda, »Quand le peuple kinois envahit les rues…«, in T. Trefon (ed.) Ordre et Désordre à Kinshasa. Réponses populaires à la faillite de l'Etat. Cahiers Africains, 61-62, 2004 61-62, , pp. 213-234. 27 In 1991 61-62, , 1993 61-62, , then in 2004 , Kinshasa was shaken by popular riots, for which hunger and political discontent was the main motivation. 28 Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social, party of the opposition against Mobutu under the »transition« of the early 1990s. 29 For instance, Eufor had no provision in its mandate to undertake any task of crowd control beyond cases involving self-defense. 30 The high level of politization of Congolese churches is noteworthy. Not only are they undermined by infl uence quarrels (such as the one that opposed cardinal Etsou and Kinshasa's archbishop Monsengwo in the Catholic church), but they also occasionally serve the interests of political actors. For instance, the hype about Kabila's allegedly foreign origins was partly calmed down by the president's religious wedding, that was carried out by cardinal Etsou in June 2006. This implies that both Kabila's parents were listed on the parish records of the Catholic church, which in turn implies that they were both Congolese nationals. On his part, Bemba extensively resorted to the sermons of popular evangelists in Kinshasa to spread his political message.
temptations of the power in place, and its own temptation to become an ignoble outlet of hatred during the electoral process.
Finally, the fi gure of the »spoiler« is a fascinating one and would deserve a longer analysis. In the transitional Congo major political reshuffl e, potential spoilers pose great challenges to the future stability of the country -they were even the main justifi cation for the European intervention in the form of Eufor. But a durable solution to this problem lies in survival guarantees the losers of the electoral process should be granted with. This must be done at the price of very »po-litical« compromises, but also by simply letting an opposition exist. To promote such interests, the pressure and the expertise of the international community may be of help to a certain degree.
Conclusion: the international community, the God Janus of the Congo
As a conclusion, the picture of the international community's interventionist interests in Congo 31 deserves a closer look. Such an interventionism is indeed capable of changing the future of the country, for the better or the worse. Thus, the face of the international community's interests resembles the god Janus -god of crossroads, of wars starting and ending; a double-faced god looking at the same time at Congo's specifi c needs and stakes, and at abstract and general issues shared by the rest of the world.
How to defi ne, then, the relationship between the very vernacular process of reshuffl e that is still taking place in the Congolese »crab basket«, and the »international interests« in their vast diversity? What are the key points of tension that provide a perspective on how these different sets of interests are articulated? There are three major fi elds in which they interact, namely legitimacy, cooperation and imputation.
Legitimacy is indeed something that the Congolese actors and the »international community« are striving for at the same time, but not necessarily in the same direction. The quest for legitimacy typifi es the hesitations of the international community. On the one hand, there is a temptation for a dangerous disengagement, now that the situation is seemingly stable in Congo. The debates concerning the future of the MONUC or of a body such as ICST 32 , who could well be both shorter-lived than expected, illustrate this point. But on the other hand, there is also a temptation for a staunch revival of infl uence and national interests policies toward Congo. Indeed, these must be accepted to some extent. advocacy for a real change in the way local and regional actors craft and defend their »Congo interests«.
So, interventionism is like »interest«, a sensitive and paradoxical topic. A little bit like the food in a hotel in the Woody Allen's movie »Manhattan«: it is at the same horrible and there is not enough of it either.
The aim of this paper was to show that the variety and the confl icting nature of interests in Congo accounts a lot for this country being what many see as a »crab basket«. That is, a construction in which the satisfaction of interests will either never be grounded on compromise, or will entail such a dramatically sub-optimal level of compromise, that it will not even be desirable. At the same time and paradoxically, Congo has also long suffered from a crucial lack of interest from the part of the international community, that partly left it slipping on the slope of tragedy and collapse, in a war that lasted seven years.
Thus, the new exciting challenge Congo is now facing is not really to bridge a gap between various rival interests competing at various levels. It is rather to fi nd an acceptable manner of having these interests competing, on a ground that is not necessarily detrimental to the common Congolese good, and to the building of an acceptably democratic and accountable state. In short, a way to put the crabs out the basket.
Ethical Refl ections on the Intervention of the UN and EUFOR in the D.R.Congo
Introduction
I intend to address four main issues in this article. First, I would like to briefl y outline the problems at stake in the Congo's crisis. Second, I will critically examine the main ethical theories with regard to a foreign intervention in a country faced with protracted confl ict and war. Third, in the light of this second part, I will ethically assess the intervention and the role of the UN and Eufor in the D.R.Congo. Fourth, by way of conclusion, I will highlight some pending challenges in respect to the future of the Congo and thereby some ethical principles that may constitute a solid basis for an ethics of peacebuilding based on »pacifi cation from outside«.
A Brief Analysis of Congo's crisis
There are numerous, and at times, contradictory analyses about the crisis of Congo. However, one can point out fi ve main dimensions of the crisis affecting Congo, from independence to the present time. These fi ve dimensions are as follows: colonialism, geostrategic equation power, political power, economic factor, and cultural pluralism.
The fact of colonialism can hardly be considered as a happy event, at least for the colonized people. Such is the case with the Congo, which was the Belgian colony Congo under King Leopold II. Historians are keen to point out that the colonization of Congo by Belgium represents the worst case among other colonies in Africa 1 . Unlike in other African countries colonized by the British whose approach was more pragmatic, 
